captured economies was a very ambiguous one. Goring was still an important figure in the domestic German economy as well as being Commander-in-Chief of the air force. As a result he was able to exert considerable pressure in determining the nature of the economic relationship established with the occupied territories. To Goring the simple answer was to take everything that could be usefully taken back into the Reich to be used for the German war effort 9 . As late as 1942 he announced that »basically I consider all of occupied France as a conquered country. It seems to me that in earlier times the thing was simpler. In earlier times you pillaged. He who had conquered a country disposed of the riches of that country. At present, things are done in a more humane way. As for myself, I still think of pillage, comprehensively.« 10 In the early stages of the occupation looting and seizures were the order of the day. The policy of removing the physical resources of conquered Europe applied as much to capital goods and design engineers as it did to Dutch jewelry or French brandy. Machine-tools and other requisitioned machinery were seized by the advancing armies by Wirtschaftstruppe and sent back to the Reich to ensure the expansion of aircraft and armaments factories at home 11 . Such a policy had the great advantage that it avoided having to expand the domestic supply of materials for the war economy to the detriment of the German standard of living. The Luftwaffe, despite Göring's influence was in a difficult position with the initial seizures, for it was largely a question of first come, first served. It was difficult to overrule the army organisations which worked through the military occupation authorities and this encouraged fierce competition 12 . It was only in 1941 that Goring became more insistent, and already had Hitler's personal guarantee that all aluminium resources in Norway were to be reserved completely for the Luftwaffe 13 . For the invasion of Russia the air force got more guarantees H , and the RLM established a Beute-Sonderkommando to safeguard all technical installations and production resources from the conquered east 15 . The result was that most of the tools that fell into the hands of the advancing troops were sent back for the aircraft industry, including a total of 8,400 large machines 16 . The
Luftwaffe also did well out of the invasion of Yugoslavia. The arsenal at Kragujevac was broken up and the machinery seized, as was that from the only rubber works 17 .
Only the vigorous complaints of the other branches of the Wehrmacht secured a parcel of this machinery for each service, while the RLM argued that they were essential for the fulfillment of the »Elch« and »Göring« aircraft programmes of 1941 1β . Ironically the failure to meet all aircraft production plans was not for want of general-purpose machine-tools, a large pool of which had developed by the end of the year thanks, in part, to the scale of expropriations 19 .
The policy of looting continued throughout the war to some degree, often following the crude pattern of priorities established in the »New Order«. Raw material stocks were removed as well as finished products which could be of use to the war effort, such as French or Czech aircraft captured intact 20 . But by its very nature the policy of seizure could not last for long. It took only a few weeks for the booty to be brought into the Reich. Later it was to take much longer to get these production resources back where they were needed when contracts were dispersed in 1943 and 1944. There was one notable exception. The expropriation of labour resources continued throughout the war 21 . For the air force this was of special importance, for it was the largest single employer of labour and yet found itself at a disadvantage in the struggle for scarce labour resources within the Reich 22 . From 1941 it was able to expand its foreign labour force until a peak was reached in 1944. By this stage out of the 640,000 workers in aircraft and aero-engine assembly plants, some 55-60°/o were foreign workers, a much higher average than in all armament firms 23 . One of the reasons was the preponderance of routine, semi-skilled assembly jobs available in aircraft manufacture. These could be easily taught to foreign workers 24 . By 1944 some firms were even reporting work with 95% foreign labour, though this was the exception rather than the rule 25 . More typical was the development of the German and foreign workforce at the Bayerische Motorenwerke (BMW) factories (see Table 1 ), where the German workforce always exceeded the foreign workforce and where the decisive turning point came between late 1941 and late 1942. Thereafter there was no large-scale expansion of the foreign workforce 26 . Beside the factory labour-force, the Luftwaffe concerned itself with highly-trained personnel too. The growing proliferation of projects at the design stage encouraged firms to recruit engineers and designers from outside Germany. They came mainly from Italy and France, and in some cases established a cordial relationship with their German co-designers 30 . More often than not, however, the designers and draftsmen were able to stay in their own countries either because it suited the interests of the German firms -sometimes anxious to »conceal« forbidden prototype developmentor because a strong enough case could be made out by the occupied power for retaining the personnel at home 31 . In France in particular the German firms were able to develop proscribed peace-time projects or new designs for military aircraft away from the scrutiny of the RLM 32 .
II
Although the strand of seizure policy ran through the Luftwaffe relationship with the European economy throughout the war, it was clear from the start that official policy was ambivalent. Where Goring favoured looting, his ministerial and industrial colleagues recognized the need for systematic exploitation abroad from an early stage in the war. As Goring's personal authority waned so expediency triumphed over ideology, although his own policy was an inconsistent one. He both personally promoted looting as well as setting down guidelines on the local exploitation of industrial resources in occupied Europe.
In a major statement on the occupation of Poland Goring summed up this ambivalence. »There must be removed from the territories of the Government General« he told ministers, »all raw materials, scrap materials, machines etc., which are of use for the German war economy. Enterprises which are not absolutely necessary for the meager maintenance of the naked existence of the population must be transferred to Germany, unless such transfer would require an unreasonably long period of time and would make it more practical to exploit those enterprises by giving them German orders to be executed at their present location.« 33 Göring's private view was that there was little to be gained from exploiting the Polish economy in Poland itself 34 , but over the occupied western territories there was no doubt that much could be gained by using industrial capacity on the spot. As head of the Four Year Plan, Goring announced in August 1940 that it was of the utmost importance to exploit economic capacity systematically in the western territories »in order to help the German war production and to raise the war potential for the fulfillment of the demands to be made in the interest of further warfare« 35 , and not unnaturally he believed that much of this capacity should be used for air force orders. Throughout the winter of 1940-41 Goring and the Luftwaffe leadership examined the possibilities, weighed up the problems and reached the conclusion that it was essential that the Air Ministry should try »die gesamte Industriekapazität in Frankreich für die Durchführung seiner Aufgabe auszunutzen«
36
. From the start of the war, therefore, the Luftwaffe intended to utilize spare capacity abroad and to make other countries provide goods for the war economy by allowing arms production in occupied areas. There were a number of important reasons for this from the Luftwaffes point of view. First of all, aircraft contained an enormous number of individual parts (in excess of 120,000 for large aircraft types). As the aircraft programmes expanded it became necessary to broaden the range of firms producing components and small parts. This naturally involved the European engineering industries, as it had done before the war through normal trading channels 37 . A second and more pressing problem was that of raw materials. Germany produced all her aluminium from imported bauxite or alumina. Aircraft requirements averaged over 50% of aluminium output per annum. It was the same for some other minerals. Magnesium was less of a problem though some was imported of which the air forces used about 90% a year. Chrome ore, too, which was essential for aircraft production, was largely drawn from European sources outside the Reich 38 .
It clearly made sound economic sense that the Luftwaffe should develop and expand its industrial activities outside Germany as rapidly as possible and as extensively as possible. For this purpose a widespread and pluralistic organisation was established which, like the counterpart organisation of aircraft production in the Reich, was as independent as possible of the interests of the other sectors of the economy or the army occupation authorities. At the centre of the Luftwaffe organisation was the GLVerbindungsstelle (GL-VS) set up alongside the other occupation offices, working with Thomas' Wehrwirtschafts-und Rüstungsamt in a loose and ill-defined alliance 39 .
These offices collected and sorted information, sent regular reports on contracts and expenditure in the occupied zones and placed orders where this could not be done indirectly through the aircraft firms themselves. In the case of a direct order a trustee would usually be sent to the firm in question who would work closely with the VerbindungsoffizierThese liaison officers, apart from their work in the central zone offices, had to visit factories, arrange contracts, check on the dispatch and distribution of goods and act as a roving inspectorate corresponding to General Thomas' Rü-stungsinspektionen. After Speer had taken control of the armaments inspectorate in 1942 the RLM representatives continued to work for their ministry rather than the new armaments department, and continued to do so until they were absorbed at the end of 1944 into the general organisation. As in the Reich, the Luftwaffe economic officers were ultimately responsible to Milch and Goring, and lost few opportunities of exploiting or emphasising their independence of other agencies''
1 . There were, of course, wide differences dictated by the nature of the occupation established. In France, the Low Countries, Scandinavia and most of the Balkans the GL-VS pattern was the prevailing one 42 . In Russia, however, no attempt was made to produce aircraft or parts and a seizure policy was the rule throughout 43 . Poland was not considered important enough to merit an organisational structure such as that in Western Europe.
Outside the directly occupied zones a variety of different economic relationships was established. In southern France special liaison groups were established to negotiate directly with the Vichy government on the integration of the aircraft industries of the two pans of France, for the Germans had soon discovered that the real prizes in aircraft production lay beyond their grasp 44 . In Hungary and Italy trustees and liaison officers were sent to the factories working on Luftwaffe orders. At the same time diplomatic channels were used for establishing important contracts in these allied areas, although as the war went on both these allies were to find that they had little choice in undertaking orders from German firms if they wanted something in return. The neutral countries already had links with many German firms and these were enlarged and extended through the work of such agencies as This policy of progressive expansion into the industrial centres of both occupied countries and allied satellites concentrated on three very different classes of goods. The output of finished aircraft was not of outstanding importance for the war effort, except that by building trainer aircraft and other less essential models in Europe, capacity in the Reich was freed for the fuller and more efficient production of essential combat types. The precise number of aircraft produced is not known. Many that were marked for delivery never arrived in the Reich or were never used. In France prototypes were constructed and then shipped back to the parent firm, where further development would take place. The bombing surveys at the end of the war arrived at a figure of 8,139 aircraft produced for Germany outside the Reich (see Table 2 ), but this does not include aircraft produced in 1940 in Czechoslovakia, or those aircraft seized by the advancing forces for drafting into service with the Luftwaffe. The addition of these two categories would give a figure of between 10,500 and 11,000 aircraft out of a total wartime production of 106,000 aircraft 49 . In Belgium and Northern France, out of a total of 115 plants working for the Luftwaffe by the end of 1940, only 5 were working on sub-assemblies or complete aircraft 53 . By April 1941 the total contracts placed in France contained orders for aircraft that were worth some 35% of the whole. The following table indicates the wide range of parts and equipment that was also supplied (see Table 3 ). In the east Udet had been interested in sub-contracting in Czech industry before the war. Even in Poland, where the small aircraft industry was dismantled, some production of parts was retained, particularly for Heinkel aircraft at the renamed Vereinigte Ostwerke at Cracow-Mielec and at a large motorrepair firm in Posen and for Junkers at four other Polish plants 55 . In the Balkans all aircraft production, centred in Yugoslavia, was run down and the firms, instead of being generally dismantled, were turned over one by one to aircraft parts production. The factories of Ikarus and Rogozarski in Semlin became branches of the Wiener-Neustadt Flugzeugwerke, itself a licensee of Messerschmitt 56 . Aeroput became a repair depot of the Lufthansa, and Rakovica of Belgrade produced spare parts for Junkers aero-engines 57 . The most up-to-date air firm in Yugoslavia, the Avia works at Sarajevo, whose equipment dated from 1939-40, was used not for airframe production but as a components branch for the Rakovica works 58 .
With the slow expansion of air-force production in Europe the Luftwaffe gradually came to replace both the army and the navy in the value and size of orders placed, except in certain zones such as Holland which had a very large naval capacity. This situation reflected the role played by the air-force in the Reich itself where it was by far the most expensive of the three services, and made the greatest use of manufacturing industry. Thus by June 1942 the Semlin inspectorate reported that over 40% of all orders went directly to the Luftwaffe^. The Agram inspectorate showed that by May 1942 orders placed for the army were worth 7 mio. Reichsmark, those for the airforce, 19 mio. Reichsmark 60 . Orders for the rest of the Balkans gave nearly 50% of the orders to the air-force, consisting mainly of metal and engineering products. The 4 mio. Reichsmark of army orders were for cloth 61 . In northern France and Paris by mid-1942 the Luftwaffe had orders at 192 firms, the army at 60 and the navy at only 9 62 . The air-force therefore built up a commanding position in those sectors of foreign economies whose role in the »New Order« had yet to be defined, namely in heavy engineering and industries of an advanced technical nature such as electronics and radio. It is almost impossible to establish the exact quantitative role of the airforce in the European economy, however, because records were not always kept in such a way that it is possible to distinguish between orders for one particular branch of the Wehrmacht. From the inspectorate records it is fair to conclude that up until 1943 the Luftwaffe took from between 35% and 60% of orders placed abroad for armaments contracts according to the level of industrial development in each zone. After 1943 the proportion may have risen considerably higher as firms were moved into Europe away from the dangers of aerial attack. Whatever the exact figure, it is clear that the air-force relied on the European economy as an industrial reserve area. Without it aircraft production might have expanded even more slowly than it did in the early years of war 63 .
The final category of goods, raw materials, was of great importance. Without the mobilization of European material resources no aircraft production could have been undertaken in the Reich. In order to maintain current production, let alone expand as planned, the Luftwaffe needed a very large import of bauxite from the rest of Europe, or of semi-finished aluminium from areas with a more developed industry. For the purpose of expanding such raw material supply the RLM began to plan new projects almost as soon as the conquest was complete. A vast new scheme was to be set up in Norway under the director of Junkers Flugzeugwerke, Heinrich Koppenberg 64 . Plans were made both before and after the occupation for expanding bauxite and alumina production in unoccupied France, Croatia and the Balkans 65 , and although the expected level of new capacity was never reached, imports of bauxite continued to rise throughout the war (see Table 4 ). Of these totals the Luftwaffe took 54. 1% in 1941, 51.1% in 1942 and 51% in 1943 67 . Magnesium was more completely an air-force material. Allocation of magnesium to the Luftwaffe averaged 90% of supplies during the war. Dependence on Europe was, however, much less, although plans existed to expand output abroad to 20% of total requirements 68 . The difficulty in expanding such resources was a general one since it depended on a variety of variables such as the level of collaboration in the occupied area, the mobilisation of transport resources, the political strategy of economic cooperation with neutrals and allies. Moreover control over the distribution and production of raw materials for aircraft production was not vested in the RLM and a constant battle between the material users often made it very difficult to co-ordinate planning and almost impossible to relate the long-term schemes of expansion with the possible short-term requirements for military purposes 69 . Nevertheless insofar as raw material planning could be affected by the RLM, it tied in with the general direction of policy in the early years of war, a policy that, despite certain internal contradictions, had been based upon the exploitation of a whole range of resources abroad which complemented requirements in the Reich itself. Such requirements were not dictated by ideology but by the needs of war. It was this policy that triumphed in practice, whatever Göring's own reservations about reversing the seizure policy.
Side by side with the official, ministerial exploitation of European resources was to be found a less formal and often uncoordinated and uncontrolled expansion of private firms and industrial groups from within Germany. In fact one reason why ministerial involvement reached a high level at an early stage of the war was because the RLM was forced to follow the firms into the occupied territories where they had established contracts, rather than the other way round. Helped by the work of the DELIKO and generous facilities provided by the air bank, individual firms were able to establish contracts and arrange orders without necessarily working out the arrangements within the general economic strategy of the ministry. All that was required was that such activity should be rubber-stamped by the local Luftwaffe inspector or VS, something which was almost inevitable since the Luftwaffe could seldom afford not to confirm a contract that might otherwise be lost irretrievably to the army or navy. There was no particular long-term policy over this since such trade had existed before the outbreak of war and in fact established commercial channels continued to be used 70 .
The absence of such a clear policy also gave the firms a large amount of leeway when arranging orders outside the Reich. Most major aircraft firms sent their own agents and agencies abroad to establish commercial contacts, to negotiate with foreign management and to get occupied factories operating again. In France this had been done even before the armistice arrangements had been completed 71 . In Poland Heinkel had arranged component production in the autumn of 1939 before the ministry became fully aware of the potential there 72 . To cope with this kind of economic imperialism the firms built up organisations abroad that in many ways duplicated that of the ministry. For example Arado of Brandenburg established in Paris an organisation with exactly the same purpose as that of the RLM, namely the supervision of contracts and the distribution of goods. Starting with a small Betriebsführungsamt the firm went on to build up a full Zentralverwaltung. This office contained nine separate departments, divided between a construction and development section. The whole structure was designed to supervise a handful of firms -Regy, SIPA, Valeri, Neuilly, La Jatte and a few repair depots 73 . These firms produced only a handful of aircraft for Arado.
Not only did the aircraft firms function alongside the RLM but the kind of contracts they established were undertaken with the minimum of ministerial supervision. A contract drawn up between Arado and Neuilly branch of SIPA in August 1943 gave the RLM the right to fix the price, but that was all. The money involved was forwarded by the air bank. Notice to terminate the contract was to be sent through the Wirtschaftsgruppe offices and not the ministry. There was no provision for control or supervision directly by the RLM officials 74 . The ministry was reluctant, though in fact often unable, to prevent sub-contracting in this way. Goring condemned the practice in 1940 when he stated that he knew »of different cases in which individual German firms supposedly tried, by means of special connections, without permission of the competent offices in the Reich immediately above the military commanders in the occupied territories, to exert influence on economic institutions in the occupied territories« 75 . There certainly was competition between the firms over foreign capacity and it was this that fuelled the rivalries between the larger firms over resource allocation and contracts. Under the conditions of surviving capitalism this was perhaps to be expected. Such competition did lead, however, to great confusion and inefficiency and was the price to be paid for allowing both official and unofficial expansion to proceed side by side without any consistent overall plan on how this expansion was to take place. When the level of utilization was relatively low, as it was before 1942, such confusion could be disguised. When the level of demands rose dramatically in 1943 the system of exploitation abroad was ill-suited to cope with the pressures it involved. The fact that both the RLM and the private firms undertook economic expansion underlined the wider problem about the relationship between German capitalism and the New Order. While considerable efforts were made to allow private enterprise to undertake exploitation on its own initiative, it was never clear under what circumstances and for what reasons the government would intervene. To this was added the problem of defining firms like the Hermann Göring Werke that acted like a private corporation but was state-owned. By the middle of the war there was some evident dissatisfaction with the way in which firms had pursued contracts and the RLM accordingly began to tighten controls over industry. Such controls did not amount to nationalisation but they did help to create an atmosphere of uncertainty between managers and officials over the longer-term development of the economy. Where Speer and the army favoured more self-responsibility, the RLM moved towards a positive state control in areas that had previously been the preserve of the individual firms and the Wirtschaftsgruppen. In the short run such control was regarded as the only way to achieve the expansion of the Luftwaffe economy in Europe. In the long run it pointed towards a growing division between the interests of industrial capitalism and that of the military officials.
Ill
Although the exploitation of the economy for the Luftwaffe was well-established in 1940 and 1941, the level of such exploitation tended to be considerably lower than actual capacity and lower than the achievement by the end of the war. In the occupied zone of France many Parisian aircraft factories remained unused until the middle of the war 76 . In 1942-43 there came a sharp change in the rate of exploitation. There was no real change in the principles behind it, for these had been established some years before and were merely extended to suit new situations such as the occupation of southern France and northern Italy 77 . There were two fundamental reasons why the level of exploitation changed. The first was the failure of aircraft production in the Reich to reach the planned level. By 1942 Germany was still producing aircraft at the rate of 1,200 a month. That had been the level planned for the first few months of war after the mobilization of the economy. Production had fallen far below what was necessary for the scale of warfare with the result that Milch, now in full charge of aircraft production after Udet's suicide, demanded a rapid increase in the programme aimed at producing 3,000 aircraft a month by 1944 78 . For such a programme it would be necessary to involve the European economy much more than hitherto. The second reason was a military one. The bombing offensive of the RAF was beginning to affect production in the Reich itself. One way of avoiding the problem was a large-scale dispersal of air contracts into those areas of Europe less accessible to bombers. Such a policy had always been favoured by the RLM because it had long been realized how vulnerable the aircraft industry was. The policy of breaking up of areas of industrial concentration (Verballung der Industrie) had been begun before the war 79 . Little progress had been made, however, and it was only under the urgency of finding a defence against bomb attack that an active policy of dispersal was taken up in 1942/43. The production failures and the need to avoid bombing thus produced an identical effect. Both the ministry and industry looked outwards to Hungary, the Protectorate, Italy and southern France as the most suitable areas for dispersing production. The two forms had, of course, to be co-ordinated. Accordingly the RLM began to direct firms to new sites, providing the necessary labour and resources to carry out the move. But it was not until October 1942 that the RLM finally decided »alle luftgefährdeten Betriebe -soweit sie noch nicht verlegt waren -zu verlegen und für alle anderen Betriebe je nach Lage eine oder zwei Ausweichmöglichkeiten zu schaffen« 80 .
By November the GL planning office was able to report that 32 out of the 51 rings connected with aircraft production had worked out dispersal programmes and of the 290 works employed completely on aircraft orders, some 211 had detailed dispersal plans available 81 . In the same month Milch called a meeting at the ministry to lay down guidelines for dispersal practice. He pointed out that there were several types of dispersal. The dispersal to the west was basically to expand direct productive capacity. That to the east was intended to protect industry from bombers and would not necessarily increase efficiency or expand capacity -in fact possibly the reverse 82 . Goring broadly endorsed the new policy, while the Speer ministry had already begun arrangements for shifting the burden of production still further onto non-German shoulders 83 . The expansion was not achieved, however, without considerable problems. Nor did it ever reach the intended level of exploitation. This was perhaps inevitable given the nature of the occupation and the sudden switches in policy towards Europe. Nevertheless the Luftwaffe gained much less from Europe than it was capable of producing. Aircraft production capacity alone totalled between 12,000 and 14,000 aircraft per year in the occupied areas with additional capacity for larger numbers of aero-engines and components 89 . Nor were the German leaders unaware of this. Goring constantly stressed the need to utilize Europe to the full for the purposes of securing a military victory. There was no shortage of grand schemes. Plans were set afoot for building a huge Junkers bomber factory in Poland in 1942. In 1944 it was proposed to build 10,000 modern trainer aircraft in Czechoslovakia. France was supposed to provide 2,276 aircraft by April 1943. None of these schemes came to fruition 90 . There always remained a considerable gap between intention and achievement. The New Order provided only a limited outlet for the expansion of production outside the Reich. There were a number of very good reasons why such limitations existed. First of all there was the problem of organisation for war production, a question that was not finally settled within the Reich itself until the middle of the war. Secondly, the confused policy at the beginning of the war had produced a situation in which contracts were being dispersed all the time in a somewhat random fashion to those very areas where the initial seizures had been carried out. This led to constant bottlenecks in supplying resources for production and often had the effect of cancelling out any advantages to be gained from dispersing contracts in the first place. Finally the Luftwaffe had to contend with a wide number of political problems. There was not only the changing policy of the German government towards the occupied areas to consider, but also the needs of the neutral and allied armed forces as well as the active political and military opposition from within conquered Europe itself. It was the combination of such factors that fatally weakened the policy of massive exploitation of the European economy.
IV
The organisational problem was largely of the ministry's own making, although the difficulty of establishing an efficient organisational structure under totalitarian control was not confined to the RLM alone 91 . The fact that no completely consistent policy could be pursued either for all territories, or over any considerable length of time, made long-term co-ordinated planning almost impossible. Nor did the ministry make any effort to counter the changes in policy -which were largely inspired by Göring's own ambivalence -by creating its own office for Europe as a separate organisation.
Instead new offices or commissions were piled one on top of another as the need arose and Goring, with his wide-ranging interests, was capable of setting two conflicting interest groups the same tasks 92 . The result of this European wide network of offices was a confusion of function. As there was no clear-cut boundary between agency and agency, no-one assumed control overall. The situation was made considerably more difficult for the Luftwaffe by virtue of the fact that Göring was both Commander-in-Chief of the air force, head of the Four Year Plan office, controller of the Hermann Göring Werke and roving economic ambassador for Europe as a whole. This helped to encourage a level of competition for resources and a struggle for influence that militated against producing a rational organisational system 93 .
It was a situation intolerable for those who had to work within the organisation as well. A typical complaint was that of the RLM trustee at the Donau Flugzeugwerke in Budapest. The organisation in Hungary had been confused from the start. The air attache, Oberst Fütterer, claimed exclusive right over all aviation matters in Hungary as representative of the Foreign Office, while the GL-VS demanded final say in all affairs economic. The attache wrote to the RLM: »There is only one leader of the Greater German Reich, and that is Adolf Hitler: and there is only one representative of the German Air Force in Hungary and that is I!« 94 That of course was the root of the problem; a fully pyramidal command structure depended on a highly efficient organisation at every level and between every level. In March 1942 the RLM report from Budapest was sent to the ministry with bitter complaints about the whole system of control in Europe and in Hungary in particular. The RLM, wrote the complainant, had set up »too many offices which must simply let matters pass through them, and only a relatively few that can decide on a definite yes or no« 95 . The solution, continued the report, was to create a limited number of departments with a clear line of responsibility and definition of competencies. This recommended solution, sparked off in this case by a small incident in a factory, pinpointed just the kind of difficulty faced by the Luftwaffe everywhere as a result of the poorly co-ordinated and controlled bureaucracy. One overall effect of such organisational confusion was the constant danger of the under-utilization of resources 96 .
There were other problems over which the RLM had less control. The RLM liaison officers had to work closely with the army authorities and later with the Speer ministry. This situation was very different from that in the Reich where the Luftwaffe retained much more freedom of action. Jealousy between the services encouraged too much bureaucratic politics and reduced the chances of effective liaison 97 . There was also the problem of coping with the individual firms. There existed considerable competition between the major companies and this, too, helped to sap the strength of the air force economy abroad. This was particularly the case in the French economy.
Here aircraft companies sought to produce the designs and prototypes of less essential or proscribed aircraft types to keep up technically with potential rivals. Deliberate efforts were made to disguise such activity by limiting the access of the RLM inspectors or by ignoring requests from the ministry to restrict production and development work to war-essential projects. Lufthansa was a particular culprit in this respect but was able to get round the instructions of the ministry forbidding the production of civil types by using the administrative chaos as a smokescreen 98 . In other cases a lack of clear direction from the top left firms squabbling over factory use as at Bayonne where »Junkers and Blohm and Voss were in continual disagreement over the allocation of capacity« 99 . The efforts of firms like Heinkel or Messerschmitt working on essential bomber designs in French industry were often frustrated by the lack of organisation, while themselves contributing to the atmosphere of business egoism that prevailed 100 . Another good example of poor organisation and the debilitating influence of administrative politics was the attempt to expand aluminium and bauxite production. Norwegian aluminium was essential to enable the expansion of aircraft production to take place. Hence the decree by Hitler giving control over all aluminium output to the Luftwaffe. Plans were authorized by Goring in November 1940 to raise the output of primary aluminium from 27,000 tons in 1940 to 120,000 tons in 1942 101 . In the end deliveries to Germany totalled only 15,900 tons in 1942 rising to a peak of 17,000 tons in 1943. Here, apart from the handicap of sabotage and work-shyness from the reluctant Norwegian workforce, the main problem stemmed from the inability of the Luftwaffe to get adequate control over the projects and prevent the same kind of administrative rivalry that was developing elsewhere in Europe. It stemmed, too, from the personal failure of Göring in using his influence either in the air force or through the Four Year Plan to expedite the aluminium plan. He failed, too, to stem the constant competition between the rival firms involved in aluminium production -I.G. Farben and Vereinigte Aluminiumwerke in particular -or to satisfactorily define the nature of ownership and control in the exploited areas 102 . Yet it was Göring who scribbled at the foot of a report from Milch »Why isn't aluminium production greater? Even with the occupied territories.« 103 The answer lay partly with the organisation set up for the very purpose of effective exploitation.
The second set of difficulties that beset the exploiting authorities came about as a direct result of the contradiction between a policy of looting and a policy of dispersal. It was not possible to do both and expect to be able to utilise the European economy to maximum effect. The random dispersal that took place before 1942 and the more carefully directed dispersal of 1943-44 ran into the same difficulties -a shortage of resources in the occupied territories of all kinds and a host of minor problems which were the direct result of trying to produce under wartime conditions at long distances away from the main contractor. Manufacturers were repeatedly faced with problems connected with the supply of a number of key production and distribution factors at a time when resources generally were stretched to the limit. More often than not it was because the labour or tools or transport had been taken away to the Reich for use there. Many of the capital goods and raw materials needed had in fact to be supplied by the Reich: the exploiter exploited. This would not perhaps have mattered if the initial seizures had been utilized to the full in Germany itself. There was evidence that this was not the case. Tools were stockpiled beyond what was really required, labour performed unwillingly as forced labour. The policy of running down industrial production in Europe also left factories idle for long periods of time making them far less useful when the decision came to reopen them. There seems little doubt that a more rational strategic course would have been to build up a well-organised European wide armaments effort from the start using resources where they were. Instead the indecisiveness of the European economic policy and the lack of effective overall planning confounded what efforts were later made to expand output. Transport was a major bottleneck, made worse for the Luftwaffe not only because more raw materials had to be taken on long hauls for aircraft production in the Reich but also because the air force had a larger sub-contracting base. The nature of aircraft production, with its emphasis on final assembly of parts supplied by a large number of smaller producers, dictated the need for effective co-ordination in delivery of parts and tools. Germany failed to produce an integrated transport network in Europe during the war. Much rail and road equipment was seized at the beginning of the war and the policy of dispersal placed severe strains upon what was left of a transport system 104 . Troops had first priority and the RLM encouraged the policy which »sought to induce every firm to buy only from the nearest supplier« 105 . Thus there was often not enough transport capacity left over to deliver resources from the Reich or bring the finished products back again. This was as true of roads as it was of railways, for road transport too had been made impossible in many places early in the war by the scale of requisitioning and the lack of fuel. This was the case in Norway where a new fast road was constructed for the aluminium project. Not only did the lorries prove to be a very inefficient way of transporting bulky raw materials but they could not be used in winter 106 . Problems were not only caused by a lack of equipment. In Greece and Yugoslavia partisan activity was most effective against railway lines, many of which carried the precious stocks of bauxite. There was only one railway line north from Greece with an efficiency of only twelve trains per day 107 . At the end of the war when the Allies were making their way across France a policy of complete improvisation had to be introduced. Special prototype aircraft for Arado were packed in lorries that took their chances on the roads that led back to the Reich, but they did not arrive 108 . Another problem exacerbated by the poor transport situation was energy.
Coal production expanded in the Reich itself but the heavy level of demands made it difficult to meet all the requests from abroad. A major problem was, however, to find the rolling stock to carry the coal in the first place. Fuel shortages played a major part in reducing Luftwaffe production in Norway and Denmark early in the war and in France and Italy towards the end mainly because most transport and energy resources had to be supplied from the Reich 109 . Labour was another bottleneck. Once Sauckel had begun the process of recruiting labour in Europe, a steady stream of workers left those very areas where new orders were being placed all the time n0 . Of course as long as labour mobilization in Germany was relatively poor the flow of foreign workers was essential for the domestic war effort. The situation would clearly have been improved by utilizing German labour more efficiently (through recruitment of women, better retention of skilled labour etc.) and by producing some overall plan for labour that avoided the constant conflicts over which firm had the prior claim. This would have kept some of the labour essential for air contracts in the country of origin rather than sending it to the Reich where it was sometimes used indiscriminately. As it was French, Italian, and central European firms complained that they could not find the designers, skilled workers and factory labour necessary to fulfil Luftwaffe orders m . In
France there were complaints as early as 1942 that, in the absence of the requisitioned skilled labour, the work could not be done without German workers to act as trainers and foremen 112 . This meant yet again an outflow from the Reich, and this time of valuable German personnel forced to work with unskilled labourers whose technical competence was often very low. Productivity remained low and German expertise diluted as a result of the uncoordinated seizure of labour for the forced labour schemes in the Reich. Only in Czechoslovakia was the situation any different, because here the RLM had intended that production should be carried on from the beginning of the war. The skilled Czech workforce, especially that in the armaments industry, was kept together to work on German orders and proved of great value when the final dispersal east was carried out in 1944 113 .
Together with complaints about labour came complaints about tools, capital equipment and raw materials. Again the initial policy of seizures had left large areas of European industry insufficiently supplied when the policy of exploitation began in earnest. The new sub-contractors were completely unfamiliar with German methods and tooling which were used to replace those of the native firms. Even in the cases of those firms whose tools had not been seized at the beginning of the war there remained the difficulty that machinery had considerably deteriorated through lack of regular maintenance. Arado described the tooling at the SIPA plant as »primitive« and yet found constant hold-ups in the supply of tools from Germany 114 . It was the same story everywhere. Dispersal was held up and its economic effectiveness much reduced by the constant difficulties encountered in moving supplies from Germany to occupied Europe 115 . Dispersal had been intended to lead to expansion of output and increases in productivity 116 . The interruptions to production caused by the lack of essential parts, tools and materials and the difficulty in transporting them from the Reich produced the opposite effect. Productivity remained low and the more widespread the dispersal the lower the productive performance. The westward dispersal had anyway been a gamble since the Allied airfields were closer to France than to Germany. During late 1942 and 1943 the British stepped up the bombing campaign against French industry working for the Germans. The decision to fully utilize the Gnöme et Rhone factories for BMW 132A aero-engines was reversed because of this threat. The Paris Renault works was rejected for the same reason 117 . Even the Protectorate was not entirely safe. In Norway the new aluminium works was destroyed by bombing as was much of Italian aircraft industrial capacity in j 943 us £ ven if dispersal reduced the chances of an immediate direct attack, the general economic complications from attacks that affected transport, energy, labour morale and the flow of supplies between producers were such as to eliminate the advantages sought in dispersing in the first place. That was why some firms like Messerschmitt and BMW preferred to concentrate as much of their production as possible in the Reich on the grounds that dispersed production was even more inefficient than production carried on under the threat of bombardment. The difficulties met by Arado and Henschel in France were often caused by bombing which made a difficult task into an impossible one 119 . The bombing campaign placed a virtual ceiling on the ability of the Luftwaffe to expand production in Europe not simply through the direct attacks on the air industry but through fear of such attacks. It was this fear that produced the radical shift in dispersal policy and it was the problems associated with such dispersal that severely limited the chances of expansion. This was a situation that the Allied surveys at the end of the war failed to emphasize. It was nevertheless the threat of destruction through bombing as much as the actual bombing itself that led to the difficulties experienced in mobilizing the European economy. The third and final set of problems that the Luftwaffe had to cope with were much more directly political and military. Aircraft production could not take place in a vacuum. In the best of all possible worlds the Luftwaffe economy could have functioned much more effectively than it did. There were, however, many other strands of political and strategic planning that had to be taken into account. One problem was the attitude of Hitler to the European economy. As long as he favoured the policy of placing orders for less essential production abroad and concentrating arms production in Germany it was difficult for the RLM to push the expansion of air orders abroad without running into difficulties with Hitler. Until the contours of the Großraumwirt-schaft had been successfully worked out it was difficult to co-ordinate planning for the whole of Europe and much easier to do what the RLM did and let the firms undertake the expansion themselves. There were so many different political agencies involved in the erection of the »New Order« that it was unlikely that the Luftwaffe would have been able to cut across the confusion and provide a systematic approach to the exploitation of the European economy, even if it were not itself subject to a high degree of poor leadership and planning.
Another problem was that of the neutral and allied states. Much of the expansion of aircraft production in the occupied countries went towards satisfying the requirements of these other European states and the appetite of Italian imperialism. Exports from the Reich itself remained at a significant level up to 1944 (see Appendix I) 120 . It was tempting to use the resources of Europe to provide armament exports to relieve domestic industry for more important tasks. In Czechoslovakia for example the captured military aircraft were sold off to Slovakia and Bulgaria. After the capture of Poland aircraft were similarly distributed, some 93 aircraft being sent to Rumania and others to Bulgaria. Aero-engine repair continued in Poland after defeat and the finished products were sold to Sweden 121 . When agreements were reached with Vichy
France, Slovakia and other satellite states it was usually on the basis that a proportion of the aircraft produced should go to the air force of the country where the production was carried on 122 . It was clearly diplomatic that such a trade should be continued but it did hamper efforts to expand production for the Reich and postponed the time when aircraft capacity abroad could be used for expressly German purposes. Unlike the trade of the Allies the movement of German aircraft abroad usually meant their loss to the Axis cause since they would be exported to neutral powers. This factor greatly complicated the planning of production in Europe, as a whole. The final circumstance that had always to be taken into account was the very fact of being an occupying power. The conditions of war made it unlikely that the European economy would be able or willing to produce as the Germans wanted. In the occupied areas there developed both a passive resistance, manifested through things like workshyness and absenteeism, and an active resistance of partisan sabotage activity. Passive resistance was hard to detect and widespread. All kinds of delaying tactics could be used to slow down production, in preventing the recruitment of forced labour, in withholding information. In France the Arado-Büro complained of poor work-willingness and deliberate obstructionism from the French manager of the SIPA firm working on the Ar 396 prototypes. In August 1943 he was replaced by someone who promised to be more co-operative and gave the name of »le Seigneur«. Six months later he was in turn replaced for creating even longer delays, and the previous manager reinstated 123 . In Norway the unwillingness of the population to work for the Nazis was notorious, and in 1942 production of aluminium essential to the air-force programme was held up by the destruction of an electricity station by the partisans m . In a report from the Armaments Staff in France for May 1942 it was noted that sabotage was still the greatest single problem to overcome. There were 140 cases in October 1941 , 40 in March 1942 in April of the same year 125 . In the Balkans all kinds of precautions had to be taken because of the partisans. The workers at the Flugzeugwerke Kraljevo could not even buy food in the neighbourhood and reinforcements of regular German troops had to be sent to guarantee their safety 126 . The hardest task was actually getting workers or managers to work for the occupying power. In France all kinds of devices were used. When the workers were taken back to the Reich itself there was less scope for direct sabotage but it was noted that they became »with-drawn, apathetic, indifferent about their work, and docile. German employers generally noticed that the workers were fairly easy to manage, but their indifferent and careless attitude resulted in more losses in production than did overt sabotage.«
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Many managers only accepted orders from German firms in the knowledge that, while providing local employment, it gave a good opportunity for directly undermining the German war effort in the European economy. Under such conditions even a well-organised and controlled exploitation would have been difficult. Under conditions where the organisation was often poor resistance proved even more effective. Resistance was clearly a predictable factor to take into account in a war situation. The fact of war made the rational exploitation of the European economy a much more challenging task. For a lot of the time most of the frontier of Europe was an air battleground and the industrial potential in many of these areas had to be turned over to a front-supporting role rather than retained as manufacturing capacity. Large repair shops were established just behind the front airfields to cope with the high turnover of damaged planes 12S . Thus the industrial mobilization of northern France, Belgium and
Holland was delayed by the fact that before the invasion of Russia the areas contained major air bases with advance repair shops and stores. Large quantities of labour had to be absorbed into constructing the new airfields 129 . In the Balkans the same pattern was repeated: manufacturing facilities became either parts factories or repair shops for the southern front 130 . In Russia the only industrial installations kept in operation were for the repair of aircraft and vehicles at the front 131 . As the fortunes of war declined so the frontiers of the »New Order« contracted and the productive capacity of occupied Europe shrank with it. The invasion of Italy pushed southern repair shops back to the north of the peninsula. The successful Russian campaign of 1943 pushed repair depots back across territory which had previously been engaged on more productive work for the Luftwaffe
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. The invasion of France in 1944 placed a severe limitation on the amounts to be extracted from the western territories. The aircraft production that had been dispersed to the Protectorate, Hungary and Slovakia found itself the subject not only of more adventurous bombing, but of the general retreat. No sooner had firms become engaged on contracts in the east than the eastern front collapsed and with it the last chance that aircraft production could be maintained for the final defence of the Reich. V Any answer to the question »could the Luftwaffe have got more out of Europe?« must take account of the fact that organisational and political difficulties, combined with the impact of war, often made it impossible to get the maximum advantage from access to the European economy. It is only possible to judge such an economic performance in the context of such problematical circumstances. Nevertheless many of the difficulties were self-inflicted. The organisational and political problems stemmed from the situation in the Reich itself. It took several years for the RLM to sort out the problems of the domestic air industry and its organisation so that it was unlikely that anything much could have been done about the European situation before this 133 
